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Rahul Rao
Temples of global capitalism have become increas-
ingly vociferous of late in their opposition to homo-
phobia. In February 2014, shortly after Uganda’s 
President Museveni gave his assent to a draconian 
Anti Homosexuality Act, the World Bank announced 
that it was delaying a US$90 million loan to Uganda 
on the grounds that the law would adversely affect 
health programmes that the loan was intended to 
support.1 Bank president Jim Kim justified the deci-
sion with the argument that ‘when societies enact 
laws that prevent productive people from fully par-
ticipating in the workforce, economies suffer.’2 In the 
same month, the Bank published a study estimating 
that homophobia and the exclusion of LGBT people 
cost the Indian economy between 0.1 per cent and 
1.7 per cent of its GDP in 2012.3 Both the Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have con-
tributed to the It Gets Better viral video campaign, 
launched to dissuade queer young people from com-
mitting suicide, with short films featuring LGBT 
staff speaking about growing up queer and being out 
in their personal and professional lives.4 In August 
2015 The Economist magazine launched ‘Pride and 
Prejudice’, which it describes as ‘a comprehensive 
global initiative tackling the business and economic 
case for LGBT diversity and inclusion’. Culminating 
in a public event to be held in London in March 2016, 
the initiative aims to bring together over 200 leaders 
from the worlds of business, politics and society to 
catalyse debate on the ‘economic and human costs of 
discrimination against the LGBT community’.5 
In this article I ask why leading institutions of 
global capitalism have begun to take activist stances 
against homophobia, and why they have done so now. 
I want to understand the terms on which the figure 
of the queer has come to be adopted as an object of 
concern for the development industry. Rather than 
pretending to offer a ‘balanced’ assessment of what is 
being called the ‘business case’ for LGBT rights, I am 
interested in thinking through how a radical queer 
anti-capitalist politics might relate to this emerging 
discourse. Central to the initiatives mentioned above 
is a common-sense understanding of homophobia as 
a cultural disposition that might be disincentivized 
through the deployment of economic carrots (the 
promise of growth) and sticks (the withdrawal of 
capital). Revisiting debates over recognition and re-
distribution politics, I argue that viewing homopho-
bia as ‘merely cultural’ enables international financial 
institutions (IFIs) to obscure the material conditions 
that incubate homophobic moral panics, and their 
own culpability in co-producing those conditions. 
Positioning themselves as external to the problem 
they seek to alleviate, IFIs are able to cast themselves 
as progressive forces in a greater moral struggle at 
precisely the historical moment in which austerity 
and capitalist crisis threaten to bring them into ever-
greater disrepute. In sum, through a critical survey 
of recent IFI initiatives on homophobia, I attempt to 
delineate the emerging contours of what I call ‘global 
homocapitalism’. 
Queering iFis
Sexuality has long been central to the development 
agenda, but it has tended to be implicit and framed 
as the driver of a host of problems, including ‘over-
population’, reproductive health, sexual violence and 
disease. Focused on regulation and risk management, 
the development industry has tended to ignore the 
more positive and affirmative dimensions of sexual-
ity. And it has, until recently, been deeply heteronor-
mative in its understanding of desire.6 As Gilles Kleitz 
puts it, ‘The poor simply can’t be queer, because 
sexual identities are seen as a rather unfortunate 
result of western development and are linked to being 
rich and privileged. The poor just reproduce.’7 
Nonetheless, the statements and initiatives cited 
at the start of this article suggest that something 
is beginning to change. HIV/AIDS has been pivotal 
in forcing an acknowledgement of the diversity of 
sexualities and prompting interventions targeted at 
communities deemed to be especially at risk. Sexual 
rights victories on issues such as decriminalization of 
same-sex conduct, recognition of same-sex marriage 
and adoption rights, and access to gender transition 
in countries across Europe and the Americas have 
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in turn led international development bureaucracies 
based in these countries to fund projects dealing with 
sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) else-
where. The growing prominence of SOGI issues as a 
development concern is also linked to the increasing 
propensity of development workers themselves to 
identify as LGBT in their professional lives. Andil 
Gosine has traced how the founding in 1993 of 
GLOBE (the World Bank’s LGBT staff association) 
was instrumental in getting staff to come out at work 
and to lobby the Bank for better benefits, but also, 
eventually, in prompting the Bank to exercise politi-
cal leadership on HIV/AIDS and to support LGBT 
advocacy in the global South.8
Understanding the terms on which new issues are 
incorporated into the agenda of the Bank can tell us 
quite a lot about the motivations underpinning such 
moves. In this regard, I suggest that we have much to 
learn from the Bank’s longer history of engagement 
with (cisgendered heterosexual) women as a develop-
ment constituency. In a study of this engagement, 
Kate Bedford argues that gender work became central 
to the Bank’s fashioning of a post-Washington Con-
sensus. Stung by criticism of its ill-fated structural 
adjustment programmes in the 1980s, which typically 
demanded liberalization, deregulation and a down-
sizing of the state in exchange for Bank assistance, 
the post-Washington Consensus purported to recog-
nize the importance of the state. It abandoned con-
ditionality for a commitment to borrowing-country 
‘ownership’ of policymaking and partnership with 
civil society, and it identified good governance, social 
safety nets and targeted poverty reduction as key 
priorities. The family, and especially poor women, 
became crucial sites for the Bank in demonstrating its 
commitment to a kinder, more inclusive and humane 
approach to economic growth.9 In this, we might see 
the Bank as exemplifying the long-standing tendency 
of imperial governmentality to legitimate its will to 
power in humanitarian justification – what post-
colonial theorist Gayatri Spivak has pithily described 
as ‘white men saving brown women from brown 
men’.10 More specifically, guardians of capitalism have 
always sought to anchor capitalist social relations 
in extra-market moral justifications, ranging from 
the libertarian virtues of meritocracy and individual 
self-worth in neoconservative defences of capitalism 
to more welfarist concerns such as gender empower-
ment in neoliberal variants thereof.11 
As Bedford argues, previous Bank gender policy 
had been criticized for overlooking the double 
burden placed on women when they entered formal 
employment, and for ignoring men altogether. None-
theless the conviction that women were empowered 
by formal employment remained central to Bank 
lending. Simultaneously, Bank research on poor men 
was beginning to suggest that economic hardship 
engendered a crisis in masculinity when men could 
no longer play the role of breadwinners. Bedford 
demonstrates how these critiques and insights 
produced a new model of intimate attachment that 
became central to post-Washington Consensus pro-
jects, wherein the Bank moved from a breadwinner-
housewife model of domesticity to a two-partner 
sharing model of love and labour in which women 
were encouraged to work more outside the home 
while men were urged to take on greater domestic 
caring responsibilities.12 Crucially, Bedford under-
scores that the new gender regime effectively (re-)
privatized responsibility for social reproduction, 
consistently privileging fatherhood promotion over 
state provision of childcare in a number of projects. 
Nonetheless it appealed to a range of different con-
stituencies because its benefits appeared unqualifiedly 
desirable: greater sharing of the domestic labour of 
social reproduction was, after all, an unimpeachably 
feminist goal. Ultimately, the success of the Bank’s 
new gender regime rested on its ability to link the 
dual imperatives of efficiency and empowerment: 
greater female employment in the market promised 
to liberate traditional gender relations, and better 
gender relations promised a more efficient allocation 
of labour resources.13 Thus, gender relations were 
reimagined in ways that purported to serve neoliberal 
and feminist goals. 
Although Bedford’s study suggests that the Bank 
was wedded to a heteronormative model of domestic 
intimacy, there are striking continuities between its 
reformulation of ideal heterosexual relations and its 
more recent interest in queer subjects. Describing 
the post-Washington Consensus interest in poor 
men, Bedford notes a tendency to think of poverty 
as engendering a humiliated masculinity, which 
manifests itself in irresponsible behaviour such as 
alcoholism, drug abuse, sexual violence and child 
neglect. These beliefs generate an insistence in Bank 
policy that ‘poor countries are more sexist than rich 
ones, and that markets transform gender relations 
in unequivocally more efficient and empowering 
directions’.14 
We can see in some of the Bank’s LGBT initiatives 
the analogous premiss that poor countries are more 
homophobic than rich ones. While lacking the status 
of an official policy pronouncement, the Bank’s It 
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Gets Better video (2011) is revealing of the perva-
siveness of this assumption. It features an employee 
reflecting that ‘some [of his colleagues] had it easy 
coming out. But some others had it difficult. Specially 
those from developing countries.’15 Explaining why it 
might be difficult for IMF staff to come out at work, 
one speaker on the Fund’s It Gets Better video (2013) 
notes that ‘a lot of people at the Fund come from 
societies that are much less welcoming of gay people 
and that is a baggage that you don’t leave at the door 
when you come to the IMF. It’s very hard to overcome 
that, I think, for people who come from those socie-
ties.’16 Yet another speaker in the IMF clip elaborates 
helpfully: ‘We have so many people from all over the 
world working here, and their ideas of sexuality, of 
orientation, of how things are supposed to be … it’s 
all very different. You have anything from progressive 
Western countries to traditional Eastern countries or 
African nations or Latin America. And everybody has 
a different perspective.’17 The pervasiveness of these 
attitudes among Bank staff is borne out by Gosine’s 
ethnographic work on GLOBE. Asking why gay white 
men seemed to be overrepresented in its membership 
relative to the gender and geographical balance in 
the overall makeup of the Bank’s staff, Gosine teases 
out two barely disguised assumptions that recurred 
in his interviews: first, that heterosexual people who 
were non-white or not from Western countries were 
more likely to be homophobic; second, that women 
and non-white men who were not heterosexual hesi-
tated to come out and to join GLOBE because they 
faced overwhelming ‘cultural’ pressures to remain 
closeted.18
Eliding ‘culture’ and levels of ‘development’, these 
discourses participate in what Jasbir Puar has influ-
entially described as ‘homonationalism’, whereby 
LGBT rights have become a new marker for old 
binaries (civilized/savage, developed/less developed).19 
But they do considerably more. In their subversive 
reworking of the IMF It Gets Better video, the Greek 
conceptual audiotextual performance duo FYTA sug-
gests that the video is also an artefact of ‘pinkwash-
ing’ in its implicit yoking of its neoliberal economic 
mission with a ‘civilizing’ anti-homophobic project.20 
Overlaying the IMF video with subtitled commen-
tary, FYTA punctures the monotonously familiar 
coming-out narratives of well-groomed, largely 
white, male, upper-middle-class professionals uttered 
against an aural backdrop of anodyne elevator music, 
with viciously snarky political and psychoanalytic 
critique. The most productively jarring moments in 
the performance come when we are reminded of the 
dissonance between the values that the individuals 
featured on the video seek to reclaim from their per-
sonal struggles, and those that they promote through 
their work. 
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When a lesbian Haitian staffer bemoans her 
upbringing in a Haiti where ‘you don’t hear people 
talking about gays and lesbians in a very positive way’, 
FYTA reminds us that Haiti’s contemporary political 
predicaments can, in quite significant measure, be 
traced back to the devastation of its agricultural sector 
by IMF policies foisted on the country in 1986 in return 
for desperately needed financial assistance. When IMF 
managing director Christine Lagarde appears on the 
video to affirm that she wants to head an organization 
where ‘everybody has to be able to be who they are, 
and they have to be comfortable, respected, proud of 
their difference’, FYTA reminds us of Fund policies 
imposing ‘user fees’ that made education and health 
care inaccessible to the poorest in many borrowing 
countries. Beyond the specific instances of hypocrisy 
that FYTA draws our attention to, there is something 
apposite about this critique being offered by queer 
Greek voices in the current conjuncture. Although 
FYTA is deeply invested in deconstructing Greek 
nationalism, committing itself in its self-description 
to ‘wiping out notions of Greek tradition and Greek-
ness’, it is not incidental that its critique should have 
emerged from Greece. Indeed it does not take much 
to imagine how self-evidently absurd it must appear 
to queer Greeks to hear the IMF promise that ‘It Gets 
Better’, even as it participates in imposing draconian 
austerity measures on their country.
If the It Gets Better videos can be dismissed as 
amateur efforts that are unrepresentative of IFI 
policy, this certainly cannot be said about the Bank’s 
more recent attempts to build an economic case 
against homophobia. Its 2014 report estimating the 
cost of homophobia to the Indian economy, authored 
by economist Lee Badgett, is revealing of the Bank’s 
emerging interest in queer sexuality. The basic argu-
ment is simple enough. Homophobia imposes avoid-
able costs on economies by lowering productivity and 
output as a result of employment discrimination, 
reducing investment in human capital as a result of 
discrimination in education, and widening health 
disparities between heterosexual and queer people 
thanks to the disproportionate risk of HIV/AIDS, 
violence, depression and suicide borne by the latter. 
Offering a conservative estimate of these costs as 
amounting to 0.1–1.7 per cent of 2012 GDP in its 
chosen case study India, the Bank seeks to incentiv-
ize governments to end homophobia by quantifying 
the economic growth that they would enjoy as a 
consequence of doing so.21
Once again, the Bank advances an efficiency 
rationale for gender empowerment, which appears 
incontrovertibly good because ending homophobia 
is desirable for its own sake. Yet in unpacking what 
is at stake here we must ask not only what the Bank 
is doing for queers but also what queers are doing for 
the Bank. As FYTA’s pinkwashing critique of the IMF 
suggests, a radical agenda is effectively conscripted in 
the service of the capitalist imperative of expanding 
output, productivity and markets. Queer visions of 
the good life become mortgaged to limitless growth, 
which is itself further insulated from environmental, 
equity, and other critiques. Beholden to capitalism, 
the prospects for a queer Green or a queer indigenous 
politics become increasingly remote. In the politi-
cal context of the Bank’s work in India, the Bank’s 
overtures to queers should invite us to interrogate 
the queer movement’s relations with other social 
movements – those of farmers, fishworkers and adi-
vasis (forest dwellers) to name only a few – that have 
struggled against the effects of Bank-led policies for 
decades. As with queer Greeks and the IMF, it is 
sobering to imagine what queer adivasis might make 
of a Bank project that hailed their participation (as 
queers) in the very processes that are destroying their 
lifeworlds (as queer adivasis). That the intersectional-
ity of queer and adivasi is virtually unthinkable in the 
imaginary of the Bank and possibly the mainstream 
of the queer movement in India begs important ques-
tions that I cannot do justice to here. 
A second problem concerns the deeply reductive 
account of freedom as participation in the market 
which appears to animate this project. There is 
something profoundly troubling about a strategy 
that makes respect for personhood contingent on 
the promise of that person’s productivity were their 
personhood to be fully recognized. To do so is of 
course not to treat persons as ends in themselves. 
But it should also prompt us to wonder about the 
implications of strategies that premiss full citizen-
ship on productivity for those who find themselves 
unable or unwilling to be ‘productive’ within the 
terms of the market – the disabled, the unemployed, 
the elderly, the ‘development’-induced displaced. One 
consequence of the increasingly tight link between 
personhood and productivity is that public support 
for welfare for the ‘unproductive’ becomes increas-
ingly difficult to sustain, especially in a climate of 
austerity. 
A third worry about the Bank’s homophobia 
costing exercise arises out of the images of love and 
labour that suffuse the report’s key claims. To its 
credit, the Badgett report is candid about the lack of 
data on LGBT working conditions in India. To fill in 
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the gaps, it makes the questionable move of extrapo-
lating from studies of analogous questions in the 
USA and Western Europe. Thus, finding that gay and 
bisexual men tend to earn 11 per cent less than their 
heterosexual counterparts and that lesbians enjoy a 
wage premium of 9 per cent in the West, the report 
averages out these numbers to suggest that ending 
LGBT employment discrimination would increase 
labour market productivity by 10 per cent.22 The 
report justifies these transnational extrapolations 
by stressing that this is likely to be a conservative 
estimate in the Indian context, given that the figures 
are taken from countries that have extensive legal 
protections for LGBT workers, and given also that 
employment discrimination against transgendered 
workers is likely to be more severe. 
It is curious that in measuring the gap between 
the status quo and a hypothetical non-discriminatory 
scenario, the report posits that gay and bisexual 
men’s wages would attain parity with those of het-
erosexual men, but that lesbians would continue 
to enjoy a wage premium. Indeed the section on 
lesbians is illustrative of my critique. Noting that 
the pressures of compulsory heterosexuality tend 
to force Indian lesbians into straight marriage and 
childbearing, the report speculates that were they 
to be freed from these pressures, Indian lesbians 
might also benefit from the wage premium enjoyed 
by their counterparts in the West.23 Although the 
reasons for the lesbian wage premium in the West 
are not discussed in the report, the ‘dual income, no 
kids’ phenomenon is a spectral presence in this part 
of the discussion. The report seems to assume that 
ending discrimination in India would have effects 
on family formation and household decision-making 
that produce something resembling queer lives in the 
Western contexts from which the quantitative data is 
drawn in the first place. In doing so, it seems incogni-
zant of the radically diverse social structures within 
which actually existing gender non-conforming lives 
in India are embedded.24 Leaving aside the matter of 
children, there is no recognition, for example, that 
the lesbian wage premium – were it to be enjoyed in 
a non-discriminatory India – might well be offset by 
the claims of ageing parents, dependent siblings, and 
the array of other relationships that constitute the 
web of obligations within which even professional 
middle-class nucleated family lives are lived. If Bed-
ford’s work on the gendering of the post-Washington 
Consensus Bank revealed a heteronormative two-
partner sharing model of working woman and caring 
man, the Bank’s latest regendering has produced its 
homonormative counterpart in the image of happily 
partnered (or single) and highly productive LGBT 
workers choosing to pursue the good life in radically 
autonomous and unencumbered style.25
In contrast to critics such as Joseph Massad, I do 
not wish to suggest that Western homonormativity is 
forced on countries like India by a ‘Gay International’, 
whether that ‘international’ is understood as Western 
human rights organizations, states or – as is my focus 
in this article – IFIs.26 Rather, homonormativity is 
enthusiastically embraced by significant internal con-
stituencies. Nor can these constituencies be reduced, 
in the narrow terms offered by Massad, to a class of 
‘native informants’ (elite local LGBT activists) who 
stand to gain personally from state recognition of 
(their) particular performances of queer life. This 
account may be true enough but it is trivial, for 
homonormativity derives its power not simply from 
the material wherewithal of its proponents, but from 
its ability to shape desire by making itself synony-
mous with modernity, giving it mass appeal or, in a 
word, hegemony. Attending to the politics of two 
recent representations of queer life in India would 
make this point clearer. 
In July 2013 the United Nations Human Rights 
Office launched a year-long global public education 
campaign for LGBT equality called ‘Free & Equal’.27 
As part of the campaign it released a Bollywood-
style music video in April 2014 featuring Indian actor 
Celina Jaitly, which went on to become one of the UN’s 
most watched videos.28 Titled The Welcome, the video 
depicts a young man bringing his boyfriend home to 
meet his family for the first time. The family are not 
expecting a ‘special friend’ of the same sex and are 
initially frozen in disbelief. But thanks to a deft and 
tactful musical intervention from Jaitly referencing 
the changing times, the mood shifts decisively and 
they all live happily ever after. Queer critics of the 
video fastened immediately on the stratospherically 
elite milieu in which it was set – the pretext for 
the gay couple’s homecoming is their attendance at 
a lavish wedding at which even the family dog is 
wearing a silk coat – as evidence of the detachment 
of mainstream gay activism from the lives of the 
overwhelming majority of queer subjects in India.29 
Indeed the choice of setting could, at one level, be seen 
as rather puzzling, given that homophobic voices in 
India already discredit LGBT rights as an elite issue. 
Nonetheless, the campaign’s decision to embed its 
pedagogical mission in the deeply familiar idiom of 
the ‘big wedding’ – whose recent cinematic genealogy 
might be traced back through films such as Monsoon 
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Wedding (2001), Hum Aapke Hain Koun (Who Am I 
To You?) (1994), and beyond30 – was a clear play for 
hegemony, co-produced with Indian artists in the full 
understanding that such texts depicting the lives of the 
super elite are avidly consumed by Indian cinemagoers 
of all classes in a range of affective modes including 
identification, aspiration and escapism. In this sense, 
what the queer critics were calling ‘homonormativity’ 
was also deeply ‘authentic’, conforming as it did to the 
canons of mainstream Bollywood cinema. 
The second representation, described on social 
media as India’s first lesbian advertisement, was 
produced for Anouk – a line in contemporary Indian 
‘ethnic’ apparel. Titled The Visit and released in June 
2015, the video quickly went viral, notching up 3 
million views in ten days.31 This video portrays a 
cohabiting lesbian couple also preparing for a first 
encounter with the parents of one of the women. In 
its aesthetic, this clip is quieter and more quotidian 
than the previous one. And it is transgressive in 
more than one sense as it becomes evident that, in 
addition to both being of the same sex, the women 
are from different ethno-linguistic communities – a 
difference that could arouse anxiety in the kinds of 
parents who might prefer to arrange the marriages 
of their children. The couple converse intimately 
but casually about what to wear and what to serve 
the parents, but there is an undertone of trepida-
tion about whether the visit will go well. For all 
its understatement, this narrative is also set in a 
comfortably upper-middle-class milieu. The women 
are surrounded by their possessions – books, make-
up, antique furniture – many of which signify their 
cosmopolitan tastes (‘tribal’ art, a framed poster of 
A Clockwork Orange). And, of course, filling every 
frame subtly but unmistakeably are tasteful fabrics 
– clothes, cushion covers, rugs, curtains – that are 
presumably the products that Anouk seeks to market. 
Produced in and for a country in which homosexu-
ality remains illegal, thanks to a retrograde 2013 
Supreme Court decision,32 the advertisement offers a 
seductive reminder of the still extant possibilities for 
queer self-expression through consumption in the 
market. We are invited to engage in what Puar calls 
‘homonational spending’, in which the market prof-
fers placebo rights to (some) queers who are hailed 
by capitalism but not by judges or state legislators.33 
In its depiction of this comfortably self-determining 
existence, this advertisement produced by and for an 
Indian company, provides almost the perfect visual 
representation of the lesbian futures that the Badgett 
report anticipates. 
In discussing these widely consumed contempo-
rary representations of queer Indian life, I want to 
suggest that – in India at least – far from imposing 
norms on an unwilling recipient, international insti-
tutions are pushing against something of an open 
door, collaborating with local actors in co-producing 
activist narratives and interpellating subjectivities 
that already enjoy considerable social even if not state 
recognition. The new homonormativities congealing 
within such contexts are not simple transplants of 
Western homonormativity but are culturally legiti-
mated in locally recognizable idioms: indeed this 
is what makes them normative in their respective 
locales. Nonetheless, the cultural diversity of queer 
life fostered by international governmentality should 
not blind us to one of its underlying and unify-
ing imperatives, namely that of folding queers into 
capitalism.
moral panic, material precarity
Given the centrality of the notion of ‘homophobia’ to 
recent IFI forays into struggles for sexual and gender 
justice, it is worth unpacking how they understand 
this term. Focusing on the Bank, in this section I will 
suggest that ‘homophobia’ is conceptualized in an 
impoverished manner that allows the Bank to present 
itself as external to the problem and therefore as a 
potential force for good, rather than one that is impli-
cated in its production. To illustrate this, I attempt 
to think through the conditions that have incubated 
a virulent public discourse around homosexuality 
in Uganda in recent years, while paying attention to 
the Bank’s interventions in, and influence over, the 
country.
The Badgett report defines homophobia as ‘nega-
tive responses to and prejudice against LGBT people, 
as well as structural manifestations of that prejudice 
in institutional settings such as workplace and the 
law’.34 Indeed it notes that the otherwise heterogene-
ous category ‘LGBT’ derives its conceptual coher-
ence from the experience of ‘stigma and prejudice’ 
experienced by people who are read into this category 
because of their attraction to people of the same sex 
and/or their gender non-conformity. ‘Stigma’ in turn 
is defined, citing psychologist Gregory M. Herek, as 
‘the negative regard and inferior status that society 
collectively accords to people who possess a particu-
lar characteristic or belong to a particular group or 
category’.35 While Herek expresses reservations about 
the term ‘homophobia’ on account of its tendency 
to individualize and pathologize the affect it seeks 
to describe, the report decides to run with the term 
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anyway on account of its widespread usage. I want 
to take issue not so much with the choice of term as 
with its understanding as status differentiation. 
Nancy Fraser has advocated a ‘bifocal’ concep-
tion of gender as both a class-like differentiation, 
rooted in the economic structure of society, and a 
status differentiation that privileges masculinity over 
femininity, rooted in the status order of society.36 
These dimensions, she insists, are analytically dis-
tinct and irreducible to one another, even if they may 
interact with each other. Gender justice, in Fraser’s 
view, requires both an objective redistribution of 
material resources to ensure that all participants 
in society can exercise voice, and an intersubjective 
cultural recognition of equal standing vis-à-vis fellow 
participants. Although Fraser notes that virtually all 
injustices perpetrate both maldistribution and mis-
recognition, she leaves open the question of whether 
the two dimensions are of equal weight. Indeed she 
constructs a spectrum of possible proportions in 
which the two dimensions might be combined, with 
injustices tilting more heavily in the direction of 
maldistribution at one end and those entailing pri-
marily misrecognition at the other. Crucially, like the 
Bank, Fraser understands heterosexism as a status 
injustice entailing largely misrecognition.37
This aspect of Fraser’s argument has provoked 
a sharp rebuttal from Judith Butler, who criticizes 
Fraser’s relegation of certain oppressions to the deriv-
ative and secondary status of the ‘merely cultural’.38 
In Butler’s view, movements against heterosexism 
attack the normative regulation of sexuality within 
central institutions of the capitalist order such as 
the family, thereby setting themselves up as threats 
to that order. Indeed Butler questions the distinc-
tion between recognition and redistribution that 
lies at the heart of Fraser’s argument, noting that 
homophobic cultural norms that misrecognize queers 
also have maldistributive effects – by denying bene-
fits or property to same-sex partners, for example. 
Fraser counters by acknowledging that while queers 
suffer economic harm, such harm is a maldistribu-
tive consequence of a more fundamental injustice of 
misrecognition. Moreover she accuses Butler of an 
indifference to history, arguing that the relationship 
between queers and capitalism cannot be asserted by 
definitional fiat, and observing that in late capitalist 
society the links between sexuality and surplus value 
accumulation have been weakened. The enemies of 
queers, she points out, are not multinational corpora-
tions seeking to extract their labour, but religious 
conservatives invested in denying their personhood. 
Capitalism, Fraser concludes, no longer needs the 
heteronormative family as a central stabilizing 
institution.39 
Fraser is both right and wrong. History matters, as 
does geography. While anti-homophobic movements 
(in the USA and Western Europe, which is where 
the Butler–Fraser debate is implicitly situated) may 
indeed have attacked capitalism at a certain historical 
juncture, capitalism responded to that attack in ways 
that attenuated the force of the critique. Indeed the 
story of this shifting relationship is central to Lisa 
Duggan’s influential critique of mainstream LGBT 
politics in the USA in the 1990s. As Duggan explains 
it, neoliberals blunted the sharp edge of progres-
sive critique by recognizing claims to equality while 
minimizing potential redistributive consequences: in 
essence, they embraced a non-redistributive identity 
politics. The distinction between recognition and 
redistribution, far from marking a real separation 
between different kinds of injustices as suggested 
by Fraser, is essentially the ruse through which neo-
liberal capitalism pretends to become more inclu-
sive.40 In its conceptualization of homophobia as 
a status differentiation, distinct from injustices of 
maldistribution (which find no mention in any of 
the IFI initiatives on homophobia to date), the Bank 
reproduces this ruse.
But it also does something more that cannot be 
grasped through the narrow terms of the Butler–
Fraser debate. One of the striking things about this 
debate and the numerous subsequent treatments of 
it is the highly agent-centred view that the argu-
ments on both sides take. Focusing on queers or the 
putative enemies of queers (neoliberals, religious con-
servatives), the argument proceeds as if things might 
have turned out differently if only these agents had 
thought or acted in ways other than those in which 
they actually did. Thus, following Butler and Duggan, 
we are tempted to fantasize that if LGBT movements 
had refused the recognition/redistribution distinc-
tion, they might not have succumbed to homonorma-
tivity in the way that they did. I am sceptical of the 
high degree of voluntarism implicit in this argument. 
Accordingly, I want to think about the wider struc-
tural conditions within which narratives about sexu-
ality produced by particular agents acquire salience. 
It is in thinking about these structural conditions 
that the implication of the Bank in the production 
of homophobia becomes more visible. I shift the geo-
graphical terrain of discussion to Uganda here for 
two reasons: first, because Uganda has become the 
site of multiple contending discourses about sexuality 
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thanks to its passage of the Anti Homosexuality Act, 
2014; and second, because the Bank’s suspension of 
its US$90 million loan to Uganda in response to the 
passage of this legislation constitutes perhaps the 
single most coercive response by an IFI to a member-
state action perceived to be homophobic.
Introduced in the Ugandan parliament in 2009, 
the Anti Homosexuality Act was given presidential 
approval in February 2014.41 The text of the bill that 
was first circulated earned notoriety for its proposed 
introduction of the death penalty for a select cat-
egory of offences.42 The version of the bill that was 
eventually passed amended the death sentence to 
life imprisonment, while enhancing existing pun-
ishments for same-sex conduct and criminalizing 
advocacy in support of LGBT rights. Following a 
concerted domestic and international campaign, the 
Act was struck down by the Ugandan Constitutional 
Court on 1 August 2014, on the procedural ground 
that it had been passed without the requisite parlia-
mentary quorum.43 Activists fear that supporters of 
the legislation will attempt to have it passed again. 
Scholarly analysis of these developments has 
tended to focus on a set of elite relationships involv-
ing Ugandan politicians and clergy and mainly US-
based Christian evangelical activists. The drafting 
of the original Anti Homosexuality Bill is believed 
to have been inspired by a ‘Seminar on Exposing the 
Homosexual Agenda’ held in Kampala in March 2009 
by a group of US anti-gay evangelical activists, of 
whom Scott Lively is perhaps the most well known.44 
For conservative Western evangelicals, Africa pro-
vides new terrain on which to fight the ‘culture wars’ 
– in which LGBT rights remain a crucial wedge issue 
– that they find themselves losing in the USA and 
Western Europe.45 Political alliances with African 
clergy enable Western Christian conservatives to 
block progressive moves towards embracing, say, 
the ordination of women as bishops or same-sex 
marriage, in global Christian norm-setting forums 
such as the Anglican Communion’s Lambeth Con-
ference. Paying attention to the evolution of these 
relationships also explains why an issue that had 
hitherto had no salience in Ugandan public culture 
became controversial at the same time as it threat-
ened to split the worldwide Communion.46 
Useful as these accounts are, they have been 
incomplete in several respects. As I have argued at 
length elsewhere, the emphasis on US evangelical 
proselytization has tended to evacuate such accounts 
of African agency.47 African elites bear significant 
responsibility for the virulently homophobic public 
discourse that circulates in many parts of the conti-
nent. To cite an example from just one – albeit the 
politically most influential – Christian denomination 
in Uganda, namely the Anglican Church, Ugandan 
clergy were receptive to the overtures of US conserva-
tive evangelicals within the Communion because 
this was perhaps the first moment in the history of 
this imperial holdover, in which African voices (and 
votes) were being courted as significant in shaping 
the future trajectory of Christian doctrine.48 Spear-
heading the opposition to greater tolerance of homo-
sexuality at the 1998 Lambeth Conference offered 
African clergy a way to symbolize the inexorable 
reality that power was shifting within the Com-
munion towards the more populous African constitu-
encies.49 For their part, Ugandan politicians in the 
ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) have 
stoked and benefited from the furore over homo-
sexuality, which has conveniently distracted domestic 
and international publics alike from other vexing 
issues such as political repression, corruption and bad 
governance.50 Yet even accounts that weigh African 
agency more heavily have been relatively silent on 
two counts. First, neoliberalism is never part of this 
story, missing the very profound effects that it has 
had both on the institutional landscape in Uganda as 
well as on everyday attitudes. Second, in focusing dis-
proportionately on the collaborative US–African elite 
production of homophobic discourse, such accounts 
have neglected to explain subaltern receptiveness to 
these discourses. 
Scholars of religion and sexuality in Uganda have 
noted the central role that Pentecostal-charismatic 
churches are playing in the production of homo-
phobic discourse.51 Now believed to command the 
allegiance of up to a third of the country’s popula-
tion, the spread of Pentecostal Christianity from the 
late 1980s onwards was enabled by two factors: war 
and neoliberalism. In the aftermath of the devasta-
tion wrought by the brutal reign of Idi Amin and the 
‘bush war’ against the government of Milton Obote, 
Pentecostalism’s promise of temporal rupture and 
renewal through ‘born again’ Christianity provided 
the perfect spiritual complement to the victorious 
NRM’s mission of reconstruction from 1986 onwards. 
In contrast to the mainline Anglican and Catho-
lic churches, the new Pentecostal churches were 
also less tainted by association with the previous 
dispensation.52 Taking over the reins of power in a 
highly indebted country, the NRM eagerly imple-
mented the neoliberal prescriptions of the Bank and 
Fund, imposed as part of the structural adjustment 
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programme that Uganda underwent in the 1980s 
and 1990s: indeed, Uganda is widely regarded as 
the African country in which the neoliberal project 
was most enthusiastically embraced.53 As structural 
adjustment gathered pace, the new Pentecostal 
churches moved into the space vacated by the shrink-
ing state, becoming major providers of social services 
such as education and health.54 By the early 2000s, 
the burgeoning HIV/AIDS epidemic offered the 
perfect pretext for their interventions in the public 
sphere with a conservative, moralizing and virulently 
homophobic discourse. 
Their efforts were given a shot in the arm by 
equally conservative donor initiatives such as the 
US Bush administration’s President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Informed by theo-
logical prohibitions on extramarital, commercial 
and non-heterosexual sex, PEPFAR diverted 
funding from progressive public health organiza-
tions to faith-based organizations among which US 
evangelical and African Pentecostal-charismatic 
churches were prominent. As Melinda Cooper argues, 
PEPFAR ‘served to institutionalize the presence of 
Pentecostal-charismatic churches in the very social 
infrastructure of sub-Saharan Africa, turning them 
into indispensable conduits to healthcare in the now 
largely privatized welfare sector’.55 Accounting for 
94 per cent of Uganda’s total HIV/AIDS budget at 
one time, PEPFAR funding had pernicious effects on 
the country’s HIV prevention efforts, transforming 
a programme that had emphasized condom use to 
one that promoted faith-based messages of absti-
nence.56 At the same time, the World Bank was itself 
promoting the involvement of faith-based organi-
zations in development and humanitarianism. In 
1998, then Bank president James Wolfensohn and 
Archbishop of Canterbury George Carey convened 
a World Faiths and Development Meeting, which 
produced an advocacy group called the World Faiths 
and Development Dialogue, devoted to promoting 
collaboration between international development 
agencies and faith-based organizations.57 Virtually 
ratifying the effects of neoliberalism, the Bank noted 
that since faith-based organizations provided up to 50 
per cent of social services in places like sub-Saharan 
Africa, they should be recognized as key partners in 
development work.58 Bank policy therefore opened up 
space for, and legitimated the work of, the very actors 
who are leading purveyors of homophobic discourse 
in Uganda today. 
I want to turn from the production of homophobic 
discourse, on which the literature has been almost 
exclusively focused, to what we might think of as 
the ‘consumption’ side of this problem. Here, too, 
the changes wrought by neoliberalism are relevant. 
Analysts have recently begun to draw on the notion 
of ‘moral panics’ to theorize homophobia.59 Stanley 
Cohen famously defined moral panics as widespread 
and volatile concern about the potential or imagined 
threat posed by a set of actors (folk devils) out of 
all proportion to any objective harm that they may 
be likely to cause, which fuels reactions of moral 
outrage and hostility against those actors.60 The 
concept seems especially appropriate to homophobic 
discourses in Uganda, given the way they construct 
queers as paedophiles, ‘recruiters’ of children into 
homosexuality, and threats to social morality.61 In 
their work on moral panics around ‘mugging’ in 
inner-city Britain, Stuart Hall and his colleagues 
reframe their inquiry in the following way. ‘The ques-
tion’, they insist, ‘is not why or how unscrupulous 
men work … but why audiences respond.’62
Asking why elite discourse on homophobia has 
popular purchase in Uganda, Joanna Sadgrove and 
a team of collaborators have argued that rather than 
echoing popular concerns, elite state and evangelical 
positions map onto and manipulate other widely felt 
anxieties, ‘many of which relate directly or indirectly 
to the profound economic insecurity and fears for 
the future (especially in the context of the HIV crisis) 
experienced by ordinary Ugandans’.63 Sadgrove et 
al. identify a deep imbrication of discourses about 
morality and money in media and popular discourses 
about homosexuality. They find widespread concern 
that moral values are under threat from a pervasive 
preoccupation with material gain. This is borne out 
by the work of Jörg Wiegratz, who has argued that 
neoliberalism in Uganda has, in restructuring the 
state and economy, also entailed a project of moral 
restructuring, inculcating a utilitarian, egoistic, 
market rationality in everyday life that has sought 
to displace ‘traditional’ values and cooperative prac-
tices. While Wiegratz is concerned mostly directly 
with explaining a spurt in malpractice in the rural 
agricultural economy, he detects a more pervasive 
worry among ordinary Ugandans that the privations 
of life under neoliberalism have made it increas-
ingly necessary for them to prioritize money-making 
over morality in the interests of survival, making it 
increasingly difficult – in their self-perception – to 
live up to their own moral standards, and feeding 
panics about moral degeneration and decay.64
As Sadgrove et al. report, the link between money 
and morality manifests itself more specifically in 
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relation to homosexuality in a common under-
standing of same-sex loving Ugandans as having 
being lured into such relationships by wealthy 
Western tourists, or into proselytizing on behalf 
of same-sex love by funding from Western donors 
and human rights organizations. Such narratives 
conflating love and money carry considerable credi-
bility in a society where family is understood as much 
in economic as in affective terms. Thus, marriage 
is not simply a romantic contract, but also an eco-
nomic transaction involving the exchange of wealth 
and establishing material relationships between kin 
groups. The production of children secures inherit-
ance and the transfer of property within kin groups, 
while also ensuring the survival of the family as an 
economic entity by providing labour (especially in 
rural areas) and security for parents in their old age. 
Newly emerging individualized sexual identities, such 
as LGBT, are difficult to make sense of against the 
backdrop of these understandings because they exist 
outside formalized networks of exchange and indeed 
threaten to redirect resources to new networks. In 
this regard, homophobic discourses that portray 
queers as succumbing to the lure of filthy lucre 
provide culturally legible explanations for these new 
identities. The key point that frames this account of 
everyday homophobia in Uganda is the reminder that 
the profound economic and existential insecurities 
that ordinary Ugandans face reinforce the tendency 
to view social and kinship relations in inextricably 
moral and material terms. Perhaps in circumstances 
of less profound insecurity, investment in marriage 
and procreation as indispensable welfare and social 
security mechanisms would decline, weakening the 
force of compulsory heterosexuality.
The Bank’s decision to suspend its $90 million 
loan to Uganda in retaliation for the passage of the 
Anti Homosexuality Act was not universally wel-
comed, even by friends of LGBT rights. The Economist 
published a scathing editorial arguing that while 
the decision was well intentioned, it undermined 
the Bank’s authority as a technocratic institution by 
embroiling it in political controversy, while also being 
capricious in singling out Uganda and gay rights 
for attention.65 LGBT activists countered with the 
claim that ending SOGI discrimination was vital to 
ending poverty and therefore integral to the Bank’s 
core mission.66 Missing in this curious debate about 
whether the Bank should concern itself with LGBT 
rights was a recognition of the degree to which it 
was already implicated in their disavowal. As I have 
argued, neoliberal policies urged on the Ugandan 
state by IFIs and powerful donors such as the USA 
have had profound consequences that are directly 
relevant to explaining contemporary homophobia in 
Uganda, opening up space for and empowering the 
very actors that are at the forefront of the produc-
tion of homophobia, and generating anxieties that 
nourish the moral panics in which queers (but also 
sex workers, ‘witches’ and others) have provided easy 
scapegoats. For reasons that are too obvious to bela-
bour, the links between neoliberalism and homopho-
bia in Uganda have never been acknowledged in IFI 
and donor pronouncements on the subject, or in their 
efforts to pressure the Ugandan government into 
moderating its stance on homosexuality. Welcome as 
these efforts have been from the perspective of local 
LGBT activists desperate for international support 
to offset their precarious domestic position,67 there is 
something deeply disingenuous about donors moral-
izing on the subject of homophobia while failing to 
recognize their partial culpability in its production 
and consumption. At best, we might ascribe this to 
a cognitive failure to appreciate their implication 
in complex chains of cause and effect. At worst, we 
might read this as an ideological effort to position 
themselves as external to the problems they claim to 
want to alleviate, allowing them to masquerade as 
agents of benevolence and to shore up the hegemony 
of ‘development’ and neoliberal capitalism as civiliz-
ing influences.
capitalizing QUEER
The term ‘homocapitalism’ has been in circulation 
for some time, largely on social media, and largely as 
a critique of gay assimilationist politics in the USA 
and Western Europe.68 In its everyday usage, it builds 
on concepts like homonormativity and homonation-
alism to signify the selective incorporation of some 
race-, class- and gender-sanitized queers into capital-
ism and the disavowal of others through a liberal 
politics of recognition that obviates the need for 
redistribution. In this article, taking as my archive a 
set of early efforts by IFIs to lend their institutional 
authority to struggles against homophobia, I have 
attempted to describe the contours of an emerging 
global homocapitalism. 
As with its domestic counterparts, global homo-
capitalism seeks to reconcile the twin imperatives 
of efficiency and empowerment, making capitalism 
friendly to queers but also rendering queers safe 
for capitalism. Such discursive moves threaten to 
split queers off from anti-capitalist movements, while 
also splitting queers themselves into those deemed 
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‘productive’ and worthy of celebration and others 
cast out as ‘unproductive’. But we also need to take 
the globality of this homocapitalism seriously. No 
doubt propelled by the collaborative efforts of a 
transnational capitalist class, global homocapitalism 
acquires hegemony by repackaging queer normativ-
ity in recognizably local idioms with which those 
outside this class can identify or aspire to inhabit. 
In its bewildering cultural diversity, homocapital-
ism perpetuates neoliberal illusions of autonomy 
and choice. I have also argued that homocapitalism 
relies on a view of homophobia as ‘merely cultural’, 
allowing it to celebrate a liberal politics of recogni-
tion while ignoring or marginalizing redistributive 
concerns. Taking prior debates about recognition 
and redistribution as a point of departure, I have sug-
gested that these debates focus too narrowly on what 
agents want or say they want, neglecting the wider 
structural conditions within which they acquire 
power and saliency. As long as IFIs fail to recognize 
their partial culpability for the very injustice that 
they claim to oppose, their efforts to inveigh against 
homophobia will only ever come across as disingenu-
ous and ideological exercises in pinkwashing.
Where will resistance to global homocapitalism 
come from? Early utopian Western queer Marxist 
texts tended to see queers as both creatures of, and 
potential antagonists to, capitalism, in much the 
same way that Marx considered the proletariat to 
exemplify the internal contradictions of capital. Freed 
up to express sexual and gender non-normativity 
by capitalism’s disruption of traditional family and 
kinship arrangements, queers were nonetheless cast 
out by capitalism’s reliance on heteronormativity 
to produce the next generation of workers, making 
it imperative for them to be part of anti-capitalist 
movements.69 That this was not, in fact, imperative 
became clear as Western LGBT movements entered 
into a rapprochement with capitalism in a politics 
of homonormativity. More recently formed LGBT 
movements in the global South are in many respects 
more beholden to capitalism because the vectors of 
their foundational Euro-American originated iden-
tities (‘LGBT’) – HIV/AIDS funding, human rights 
discourses, global media, elite diasporic travellers 
– are borne along by the circuits of global capital. 
Although these identities take their place within 
complex gender landscapes populated by older 
indigenous queer lifeworlds, the disproportionate 
power and leadership wielded by LGBT constituen-
cies within those landscapes might render them less 
antithetical, as a whole, to the interests of capitalism 
than queer Marxists had once hoped. While a full 
consideration of this question is beyond the scope of 
this article, it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
most determined resistance to global homocapitalism 
will not come from the LGBT movements with which 
the IFIs seek alliance, given their reliance on the 
flows and infrastructures of neoliberal globalization. 
Nor is it likely to come from movements that have 
long struggled against the IFIs but within a largely 
heteronormative framework. If the critique offered by 
this article has a constituency, it probably lies in the 
very figurations of unproductive, ‘anti-development’ 
queerness that haunt the imaginaries of homo-
capitalist discourse.
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